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This paper examines how U.S. migration management techniques affect the 
flow of undocumented migrants from Mexico and Mexican migrants’ degree 
of socio-economic reorientation. The findings support the hypothesis that 
stricter U.S. border enforcement increases migrants’ detachment from their 
place of origin, and that this in turn leads to a net increase in the volume of 
illegal Mexican migration. Estimates suggest that the increase in border 
enforcement in the 1990s induced between 245,000 and 360,000 Mexicans 
per year to migrate illegally. The results also suggest that narrowing the U.S. 
– Mexican wage gap would reduce both the extent of illegal Mexican 
migration and the degree of migrants’ detachment from their place of origin. 
In addition, the results indicate that guest-worker programs, which facilitate 
continuing attachment to the migrant’s place of origin, might be a desirable 
option in the short-term. 
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A perverse consequence of draconian border enforcement is that it does not deter would-be 
migrants from trying to enter the country so much as it discourages those who are already 
here from returning home. The end result of a border buildup is typically longer trip 
durations, lower probabilities of return migration, and a shift toward permanent settlement.  
[Massey et al. 2002, pp. 128 – 129] 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Homeland Security (2007) estimated that in January 2006, 
11.6 million undocumented migrants resided in the U.S., of whom 57 percent were 
Mexican. The net inflow of undocumented aliens in the new millennium alone was 
estimated to average 690,000 per year, an amount larger than the populations of 
Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota or Alaska (for data, see Passel and Suro 2005). Given 
the apparent mass influx of undocumented migrants, neither the extent to which the U.S. 
society and politics have recently been captivated by the “immigration debate” nor the 
proposed concentration on enforcement activities to “get the border back under control” 
might seem surprising. Indeed, over the last two decades U.S. immigration authorities 
have already hired several thousand additional enforcement personnel; begun to install 
fencing, vehicle barriers, and automated biometric scanning devises at U.S. borders; and, 
recently, hired a private military contractor to install a “virtual fence” of high-tech 
surveillance facilities along the U.S. border.  
Beyond their intuitive appeal, however, little scientific evidence exists to support 
the efficacy of costly enforcement activities. The few studies that have analyzed the 
impact of U.S. border enforcement on the volume of illegal Mexican migration have 
reported mixed results. Even more striking is the lack of studies that examine the impact 
of U.S. border enforcement on other aspects of Mexican migration behavior, such as 
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preferred migration strategies or migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation from 
Mexico to the United States. This study attempts to shed light on these questions.  
Using a summary index to measure migrants’ degree of socio-economic 
reorientation, and controlling for individual heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity 
of border enforcement, I find that U.S. border enforcement significantly increases 
Mexican migrants’ detachment from their country of origin. Furthermore, I find that 
greater U.S. border enforcement increases Mexicans’ propensity to migrate illegally. I 
attribute this perverse effect to the enforcement-induced increase in migrants’ 
detachment, which reduces migrants’ remittances and economic activity at home, thereby 
prompting other community members to out-migrate to the United States. I estimate that 
the tripling of U.S. border enforcement in the 1990s, as measured by “line-watch hours” 
of U.S. border patrol agents, encouraged between 245,000 and 360,000 Mexicans per 
year to migrate illegally. It also induced Mexican migrants’ to move one-forth of their 
family dependents to the. U.S., elevated their total U.S. time by 17.6 percent, reinforced 
their efforts to obtain long-term visas by 23 percent, and increased their likelihood of 
acquiring a U.S. house by 6 percent. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the setting and 
reviews the relevant literature. The third section presents a simple model of international 
migration behavior. The fourth section discusses the data, and the fifth section develops 
an econometric model. The following three sections present the results of econometric 
estimations: section six examines the net impact of border enforcement on Mexicans’ 
propensity to migrate illegally; section seven examines the effect of border enforcement 
on Mexican migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation; and section eight re-
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evaluates border enforcement’s impact on Mexicans’ propensity to migrate illegally when 
accounting for its indirect stimulation channel. Section nine discusses policy implications 
and the final section provides a summary. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The Recent History of Mexico – U.S. Migration and U.S. Migration Management 
The U.S. - Mexican farm labor program of 1942, known as “Bracero Program,” 
marks a milestone in the history of Mexico – U.S. migration: the beginning of Mexican 
mass migration. At its height in the late 1950s, between 400,000 and 450,000 Mexican 
farm workers legally entered the U.S. every year (Massey et al. 2002). When the Bracero 
Program concluded in 1964 without a successor, many Mexican villages and rural towns, 
particularly in the central-western region, began to develop a tradition of undocumented 
migration to the U.S. (Massey et. al 1987). However, the typical migrant – a young, male 
blue-collar worker laboring in California – still remained strongly connected to his 
community of origin. He normally chose a seasonal or temporary migration strategy, with 
his spouse, children, and assets remaining in Mexico, which motivated frequent return 
trips and generous remittances (Massey et al. 1987).  
Hoping to manage rising illegal migration, the bipartisan Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 offered both carrots and sticks. On the one hand, it legalized 
about 2 million undocumented Mexican migrants with prior U.S. work experience. On 
the other hand, it also paved the way for an escalation of U.S. border enforcement in the 
1990s. Yet apprehending undocumented migrants at the U.S. border proved ineffective in 
stemming the inflow, as undocumented migrants became accustomed to contracting 
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smuggling experts and multiple entry trials, enabled by a U.S. “catch-and-release” policy. 
Hence, U.S. migration management shifted to a “prevention-through-deterrence” strategy 
(Cornelius 2007). Rather than trying to apprehend undocumented migrants at the U.S. 
border, this strategy intended to dissuade potential migrants from attempting to cross the 
border. Visible enforcement resources were concentrated at the main illegal border 
crossing points. Illegal Mexican mass migration did not cease (Passel and Suro 2005), but 
migrants appear to have become more permanent and diversified (Massey et al. 2002): 
female and dependent migration rose, trip duration increased, and migrants’ destinations 
diversified (Reyes et al. 2002). 
 
U.S. Border Enforcement and the Volume of Illegal Migration  
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) examine how U.S. border enforcement affects the 
number of migrants apprehended at U.S. borders. Controlling for possible endogeneity of 
border enforcement, they find that stricter controls result in more border apprehensions. 
Yet in a later study, the same authors find that border enforcement does not “Granger-
cause” border apprehension (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001). Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2003) report mixed results. Moreover, the implication of a rise or fall in the number of 
border apprehensions for the volume of undocumented migration is unclear. While 
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) take an increase in border apprehensions as an indication 
of deterrence, Espenshade (1995), Orrenius and Zavodny (2003), and others argue that 
border apprehensions are a proxy for the inflow of illegal migration.2  
                                                 
2 These diametrically opposed interpretations seem to stem from a disagreement about the 
consequences of being apprehended. While Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) assume that 
apprehended migrants are deterred from entering into the U.S., Espenshade (1995) draws 
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Angelucci (2005) examines Mexicans’ decisions whether or not to migrate. She 
finds that U.S. border enforcement significantly reduces Mexicans’ propensity to migrate 
illegally. Yet in a similar specification and data set, Gathmann (2004) finds no 
statistically significant effect.3 Kossoudji (1992) reports that being apprehended increases 
migrants’ hazard of making another U.S. trip (see also Carrion and Sorensen 2006; Reyes 
et al. 2002; Richter at al 2005). Summarizing the relevant econometric studies, Table C.1 
in Appendix C highlights the disagreement in the literature regarding border 
enforcement’s impact on the volume of illegal migration: about one-third of the studies 
find a significant deterrence effect, one-third find a significant stimulation effect, and 
one-third find no statistically significant effect. 
 
Border Enforcement’s Impact on Migration Strategies 
When policy makers propose to “tighten borders,” they appear unaware of the fact 
that this may provoke other unwanted changes in migration behavior. Kossoudji (1992) 
seems to have been the first to note that Mexican migrants change their migration 
patterns in response to heightened U.S. border enforcement. She finds that migrants who 
are apprehended stay a longer period in the U.S. on their next successful trip, attributing 
this to lost income and additional migration costs. Reyes et al. (2002) link Mexicans’ 
falling probability to return home in the 1990s to increased border vigilance. While they 
                                                                                                                                                 
on field researchers’ observation that many apprehended migrants simply try again (see 
also Donato et al. 1992; Cornelius 2005).  
3 Gathmann further reports that Mexican migrants’ demand for smuggling services and 
the smuggling price have very low elasticities with respect to border enforcement, around 
0.4 and 0.12, respectively. 
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fail to confirm this hypothesis econometrically, possibly due to the low statistical power 
of their specification, Angelucci (2005) reports supporting regression results.  
There are indications that U.S. border enforcement has changed Mexicans’ 
migration behavior in other ways, as well. Migrants’ degree of socio-economic 
reorientation towards the U.S. appears to have risen: dependent migration has increased, 
settlement in the U.S. has become more common, and more migrants have successfully 
legalized (Cornelius 2007; Reyes et al. 2002).4 Massey et al. (2002) have related this 
reorientation to the concurrent tightening of U.S. border controls. However, no study has 
yet examined this link econometrically, possibly because it has been difficult to quantify 
migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation.  
In another study (Kaufmann 2008a) I have argued that choices that reflect 
migrants’ latent degree of socio-economic reorientation (or migration intensity), such as 
investments into localized assets, remittance sending, and migration patterns (return and 
repeat migration behavior), are likely to be complementary. Finding empirical evidence 
that in the U.S. - Mexican case these choices are strongly correlated, I derive an Index of 
Migration Intensity (IMI) that summarizes migrants’ degree of socio-economic 
reorientation. In the present paper, I use the IMI to examine the impact of U.S. migration 
policy on migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation. 
                                                 
4 Another reaction appears to be a shifting of Mexicans’ crossing routes away from the 
traditional Tijuana-San Diego region to border segments further east (see Eschbach et al. 
2003). Since these new crossing routes are often more remote and dangerous, Eschbach 
et al. identify this development as one of the reasons for the increase in border-crossing-
related deaths from 180 in 1990 to 490 (GAO 2006) in 2005. 
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3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION BEHAVIOR 
In modeling international migration behavior I will distinguish two types of 
migration-related choices: first, agents’ decisions whether to become a migrant or not 
(“extensive migration behavior”) and, secondly, migrants’ decisions about how strongly 
to reorient themselves from the place of origin to the destination (“intensive migration 
behavior”). The latter is reflected in choices regarding return and repeat migration, 
remittance sending, and investment into localized assets. I construct a two-stage model, 
in which the first stage is a traditional Harris-Todaro (1970) model of the “go-no-go” 
decision, and the second considers intensive migration behavior.5 
Assume that individuals value two commodities: consumption of goods (C) and 
spending time at home (“home-time consumption”).6 By home-time consumption (HT), I 
refer to migrants’ desire to return home to spend time with family and friends or to be in 
their homeland (e.g., Massey et al. 1987). Individuals can choose between migrating to a 
foreign country called “U.S.,” where they earn a real wage rate w*, or staying in their 
home country called “Mexico,” where they earn w. In addition to this “go-no-go” 
decision, migrants can also decide whether to return home and whether to make 
additional trips. This is represented by the number of return trips to Mexico (n), with 
values n1 larger than one indicating that migrants make a total of n1 round trips. Each 
time a migrant enters the foreign country he incurs migration costs (M), which include 
traveling costs, border crossing expenses (e.g., smuggler fees) and job search costs.  
                                                 
5 This section is a shortened version of Chapter four in Kaufmann (2008b). While I do 
not model localized investment behavior here, due to simplicity, the interested reader 
may refer to the longer version.  
6 My model is related to Hill (1987), who assumes that agents value consumption, total 
time at home, and traveling.  
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Let the average trip lengths in the U.S. and Mexico be t* and t, respectively. Each 
individual may then select his preferred number of trips and his preferred average trip 
lengths, as long as his budget constraint holds and the joint trip lengths do not surpass his 
time endowment T, or max{n,1}(t+t*)=T. For example, for an emigrant (n,t=0) t* equals 
T, while t + t* = T holds in the case of a single-visit “target earner” (n=1).  
Let agents’ home-time consumption be HT(n,t)=ntα, with 0<α<1. This 
specification has two desirable properties. First, utility increases as total time at home (nt) 
rises and, secondly, it allows for smoothing over time (see Hill 1987); that is, migrants 
experience home-sickness and therefore value several short trips more than one long trip 
of equal length. Non-migrants enjoy maximal HT, which I define as L. Furthermore, I 
assume that migrants’ home-time consumption is complementary to the amount of 
remittances they send (R).7 For simplicity, I take HT and R to be perfect complements, 
bundling both into the composite good Z(HT, R) = min{R, HT}; thus for non-migrants, Z 
= L holds. Finally, I assume that both migrants and non-migrants have identical Cobb-
Douglas utility functions: U(C,Z)=CδZ(1-δ).  
The solution of the first stage of the model, the “go-no-go” decision, involves a 
comparison between the utility of non-migration, UNM=(Tw)δL(1-δ), and the utility derived 
                                                 
7 The remittance literature offers three main motives for remitting - altruism, reciprocal 
exchanges, and self-regarding behavior (see Rapoport and Docquier 2007). Each of these 
rationales is linked to the migrant’s intention to return home. If a migrant were to remit to 
increase his “status” at home or improve his chances to inherit land (Lucas and Stark 
1985) he would generally have to return home to claim these localized goods or services. 
Similarly, in the case of reciprocal exchanges, such as paying somebody to supervise 
one’s assets at home, the migrant benefits only if he returns. Indeed Rapoport and 
Docquier (2005, p. 13) state, “[s]uch [exchange] motivations are generally the sign of a 
temporary migration, and signal the migrants’ intention to return.” Remitting out of 
altruism may also depend on return in order to maintain the relationship with the 
beneficiary. At the same time, remitting makes home-time consumption more valuable 
because of the acquired local services or goods, or continuing affection. 
10 
from the optimal migration strategy, UM. The latter can be determined by solving the 
second stage of the model: 
 
(1)  
( )
{ }
(1 )
* *
*
max  C Z R,HT(n, t)
{C,R,n, t}
subject to
-Budget constaint:   C M max{n 1,0}M R Tw nt(w w)
-Time constaint:     max{n,1}(t t ) T
-Remittances/ HT:  Z=A min R,HT ;  HT(n, t) nt
-Ranges:                 A, R
−δδ
α
+ + − + ≤ − −
+ =
+ =
*, C, t, t 0;  n {0,1,2,...};  ,    (0,1)≥ ∈ α δ ε
 
 
where, to recapitulate, C refers to consumption of goods, HT refers to home-time 
consumption, R refers to remittances, n is the return trip frequency, t refers to average trip 
duration in Mexico, w is the real wage rate in Mexico, M refers to migration costs, T is 
the total time endowment, A is a technical parameter,8 and the asterisk indicates U.S. 
variables.  
 
Solution and Comparative Statics 
It is now possible to calculate the first order conditions (FOCs) of maximization problem 
(1) and search for interior solutions; that is, solutions that satisfy the FOCs, and imply t, 
t*>0 and n>1.9 Transforming the Cobb-Douglas function into logs and facilitating, two 
FOCs describe the model’s second stage: 
                                                 
8 A is included to prevent the marginal utility of Z from going to infinity as HT or R 
approach zero – a peculiarity of the Cobb-Douglas utility function – which would rule out 
emigration strategies. A may be interpreted as indicating migrants’ “relative comfort of 
living abroad.” 
9 Allowing any interior solution (n*, t*) to be non-integer with respect to n is an 
approximation that reduces mathematical costs considerably while the comparative 
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(1a) 
1 * 11 nt n(w w) nt
Z C
α− α−− δ α − +α=δ  
(1b) 
*1 t t(w w) t M
Z C
α α− δ − + +=δ  
 
Equations (1a) and (1b) show that migrants need to balance the marginal benefits 
of more home-time consumption due to longer average stays in Mexico (1a) or more 
frequent returns (1b) against the opportunity cost of lost consumption due to missed U.S. 
income, increased remittances, and (in the case of 1b) additional migration costs. 
Equations (1a) and (1b) uniquely determine the optimal interior solution (see Table A.1 
in Appendix A). 10 
 
Comparative Statics: We may now examine how marginal changes in parameters 
affect migrants’ intensive migration behavior.11 Higher migration costs – arising, for 
example, from stricter border enforcement – raise the opportunity cost of home-time 
consumption for migrants. This reduces the equilibrium values of home time-
consumption and complementary remittances, while increasing the optimal consumption 
of goods. Furthermore, in trying to reduce the “price shock” to traveling, migrants make 
                                                                                                                                                 
statics of (n*, t*) should approximate average effects well. To find exact solutions, the 
utility at the two integer values closest to n* (and associated t values) would need to be 
compared. 
10 It should be noted that a second migration strategy exists - the boundary where 
migrants make exactly one return trip (n=1). This strategy is optimal under certain 
conditions. However, due to simplicity and similar marginal effects, I concentrate on the 
migration strategy as defined in table 1 (for additional results, see Kaufmann 2008b).  
11 The mathematical details behind the cited results are given in Appendix A. The 
simulation results cited here can be found in Kaufmann (2008b). 
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fewer trips but stay longer; simulations suggest that total U.S. time is likely to rise. In 
sum, if migration costs increase migrants’ reorient more to the U.S. A rise in the real U.S. 
wage rate has, ceteris paribus, the opposite effect on migrants’ intensive migration 
behavior. Migrants choose to reorient less to the U.S.: as a higher U.S. wage rate enlarges 
migrants’ total income, migrants consume more goods but also remit more and travel 
more frequently; according to simulations, total U.S. time is likely to fall.  
The direct effects of marginal parameter changes on the first stage of the model 
are quite intuitive: ceteris paribus, if the U.S. - Mexican wage gap shrinks, or if tighter 
border controls raise migration costs, agents’ likelihood to remain in Mexico increases, as 
the net benefit of migration falls. However, it should be noted that the deterrence effect of 
border enforcement depends on the assumption that non-migrants’ income is unaffected 
by changes in border enforcement. In labor-exporting regions, such as the central 
highlands of Mexico, this assumed independence may not hold. Non-migrants benefit 
from other migrants’ transfers, due to both direct income transfers and indirect multiplier 
effects.12 Recalling that remittances fall if migration costs rise (dR/dM<0), we note that 
non-migrants’ income shrinks if migration costs increase. This indirect effect weakens 
border enforcement’s direct deterrence effect. Indeed, the indirect effect may outstrip the 
direct one, in which case border enforcement would stimulate more migration. 
 
Hypotheses for Empirical Testing 
The model presented above generates the following hypotheses: 
H1: The direct impact of elevated border controls is to reduce Mexicans’ 
                                                 
12 Adelman et al. (1988) found that every remitted U.S. dollar increased the Mexican 
GNP by about three.  
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propensity to migrate illegally. 
H2: Elevated border enforcement also leads to a further detachment of Mexicans 
who succeed in migrating or have already migrated, resulting in a reduction in 
remittances.  
H3: The latter effect is expected to stimulate more illegal migration. Depending 
on whether the direct deterrence effect or the indirect stimulation impact carries more 
weight in Mexicans’ decision whether or not to migrate, the net effect of heightened U.S. 
border enforcement on migration inflows could be negative or positive.  
H4: A growing U.S. - Mexican wage gap, due to either rising U.S. earnings or 
falling Mexican earnings, motivates more Mexicans to migrate.  
H5: Wage increases on either side of the border reduce migrants’ detachment 
from their place of origin, as the relaxation of the budget constraint allows for more 
return trips and remittances. (It is possible, however, that migrants interpret higher U.S. 
earnings as a sign of “being welcome,” which would make the net effect of U.S. wages 
on home detachment indeterminate, a priori.)  
In addition, migration networks are expected to facilitate illegal migration (see 
Palloni et al. 2001; Munshi 2005). Having more family members in the U.S. could also 
induce detachment from Mexico. An increase in available legal employment 
opportunities, in particular long-term visas, could also lead to higher detachment, but 
since visas ease cross-border travel, their net impact is uncertain, a priori, and might vary 
depending on the type of visa. 
These hypotheses are tested against empirical evidence in the remainder of this 
paper. 
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4. DATA 
This study uses panel data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), a 
collaborative research project based at Princeton University and the University of 
Guadalajara.13 Since 1982, the MMP has surveyed both migrants and non-migrants in 
Mexican communities during the winter months to take advantage of the regular return 
visits of migrants. Each community is visited once, and about five communities are 
surveyed in a given year. The MMP database for the years 1982 to 2006 includes data 
from a total of 114 communities, in each of which roughly 170 randomly chosen 
households were interviewed. This sample gives a total of 19,003 surveyed household 
heads, of whom 6,759 migrated at some point.14 Using household heads’ retrospective 
accounts, I construct two panels covering the period from 1972 to 2004.15 The “ME 
panel” includes both non-migrant and migrant household heads in order to examine 
extensive migration behavior. The “MI panel” includes only migrant household heads in 
order to examine intensive migration behavior. 
 
Extensive Migration Behavior: The Decision Whether or Not to Migrate 
The ME panel includes 362,160 individual-year observations of potential 
undocumented migrants. Potential undocumented migrants are working-age Mexicans 
who do not possess legal U.S. immigration documents and are currently not residing in 
the U.S. on an ongoing trip. The dummy variable MEi,t equals one if individual i starts a 
                                                 
13 The data set is publicly available at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu. 
14 I use household heads, since their dataset contains all the necessary information. 
15 I exclude earlier observations as some of my variables start to be observed in 1972. I 
choose 2004 as end point as the MMP dataset includes too few observations thereafter.  
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new trip to the U.S. in year t, and zero if he stays in Mexico that year.16 There are many 
more “non-trip” observations (351,024) than trip observations (11,136), and about two-
thirds of the household heads never migrate. Figure 1 depicts year averages of individual 
ME values, sometimes referred to as the average “propensity to migrate illegally.” 
Mexicans’ propensity to migrate illegally averaged 0.031 in the sample period. It rose 
steadily throughout the 1970s as Mexicans were looking for alternative migration 
opportunities after the conclusion of the Bracero Program. The marked drop in 1987 is 
due to the IRCA, which enabled around 2 million undocumented Mexican migrants to 
legalize and thus shrank the pool of potential undocumented migrants.  
 
Figure 1: Mexicans’ Propensity to Migrate Illegally  
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Notes: Graph shows annual likelihood of new U.S trip of Mexicans without U.S. visa.  
 
                                                 
16 I drop individual-year observations of continued residence in the U.S.; that is, the 
second, third, and higher years of a multi-year U.S. trip (see also Angelucci 2005). 
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Intensive Migration Behavior: Migrants’ Degree of Socio-Economic Reorientation 
The MI panel includes 24,948 individual-year observations of working-age 
migrant household heads.17 Starting with a set of observable indicators that reflect the 
relevant aspects of migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation, I use principal 
component analysis to combine the indicators’ information into an Index of Migration 
Intensity (IMI) (see Kaufmann 2008a). The four indicators are the proportion of total 
time that the migrant spends abroad; a house index indicating whether, and if so, in which 
country, the migrant owns a house; the proportion of the migrant’s dependents who 
currently reside in the U.S.; and a dummy variable indicating if the migrant has long-term 
U.S. immigration documentation (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). Principal component 
analysis indicates that these indicators are highly correlated and can be well summarized 
by a unidimensional Index of Migration Intensity (IMI).18 Figure 2 shows the annual 
progression of the IMI, averaged across individuals and purged of a linear time trend. 
Mexican migration intensity started to rise strongly in the aftermath of the 1986 IRCA. 
The increase in the IMI was particularly steep in the mid-1990s, a time of burgeoning 
U.S. border enforcement (see Figure 3).  
 
                                                 
17 In the MI panel observations of individual migrants are included once every five years, 
in accordance with the sampling frequency of the Index of Migration Intensity (for more 
details, see Kaufmann 2008a).  
18 The construction of the IMI is also robust to the inclusion of additional variables, such 
as indicators for remittance sending, language capability (both of which are not used 
here, as they are available only as time-invariant variables in the MMP), and business 
ownership. For details, see Kaufmann (2008a). 
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Figure 2: Annual Progression of the Index of Migration Intensity (De-Trended) 
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Notes: Graph shows annual average of IMI after purging a linear time trend and smoothing over five years; 
Graph includes only migrants interviewed after 1997 to improve comparability across time (n=10,550). 
 
U.S. Border Enforcement and Instruments  
To measure U.S. border enforcement, I use an updated version of Hanson and 
Spilimbergo’s (1999) time-series on the number of hours that U.S. border patrol agents at 
the southern U.S. border use for “line-watch activities” (“line-watch hours”). As Figure 3 
shows, line-watch hours rose sluggishly until the early 1990s. Then they grew rapidly, 
tripling in less than one decade to peak at 9.8 million hours in 2001. Simultaneously, the 
real budget of the border patrol agency quadrupled, reaching $1.2 billion in 2001 (in 
dollars of 1995).19  
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) argue that U.S. border enforcement might be 
endogenous if unobservable or uncontrollable shocks change the behavior of both 
migrants and U.S. immigration authorities. To address this potential problem, the authors 
                                                 
19 I also construct a “regional border enforcement” series which varies across time and 
Mexican states. For this purpose I use Hanson and Spilimbergo’s second time series 
(“total enforcement hours”), which has a spatial breakdown (for more details, see 
Appendix A-II). Due to the series’ shorter time span and highly collinear progression 
across regions, I use it only for additional robustness tests. 
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propose the use of instrumental variables (IV) estimation.20 I test three different sets of 
instruments for border enforcement. First, I use the real budget of the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), as Angelucci (2005) has proposed.21 Second, I use Carrion 
and Sorensen’s (2006) indicators for the “political clout” of U.S. border states. Third, I 
construct dummy variables which indicate the party affiliation of the U.S. president and 
the majorities in U.S. Congress (“political majority instruments”), the idea being that 
under Republican rule border enforcement tends to be tougher (see Table C.2 in 
Appendix C).22  
 
Wages and Other Independent Variables 
As income measures, I include predicted monthly wages in the U.S. and Mexico. 
These are predicted for each individual, year and country, and deflated into real terms 
(for details, see Appendix A-II). The use of predicted wages is preferable to the use of 
observed wages due to possible sample selection bias (Taylor 1987). Furthermore, 
predicted wages are less prone to be collinear with other macro-level variables than 
person-invariant wage indexes. To measure migration networks, I create a variable for 
                                                 
20 I found that Hanson and Spilimbergo’s proposed instruments – several election 
dummies, the U.S. defense budget, and lags in border enforcement and border 
apprehensions – performed poorly with my data set. In my first stage results, the election 
dummies were not statistically significantly related to line-watch hours and the defense 
budget was negatively correlated to line-watch hours, which seems unreasonable. Hence I 
use alternative instruments. 
21 Using the DEA budget as an instrument for border enforcement might not solve 
potential endogeneity problems, as the U.S. border patrol is also involved in drug control 
activities, according to Massey and Singer (1998).  
22 The “political majority instruments” should be uncorrelated to shocks to the Mexican 
economy as well as to shocks operating at the U.S. local or regional level, such as 
changes to local employment conditions or housing or enforcement regulations. 
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how many of the migrant’s two parents ever migrated to the U.S. prior to the current 
period.23 To measure the availability of long-term legal employment opportunities, I 
include the annual number of green cards granted to Mexicans.24 I further include two 
types of short-term visas in additional specification tests. I use the yearly change in the 
Mexican consumer price index (CPI) to control for Mexican economic crises, and add 
additional macroeconomic variables in robustness tests. Descriptive statistics of all 
variables are provided in Table C.2 in Appendix C.  
 
Figure 3: Line-Watch Hours of U.S. Border Patrol Agents at the Southern U.S. 
Border 
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Source: Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999), updated.  
 
Data Issues 
Since the MMP selects communities non-randomly, strictly speaking it is 
representative only for the populations of the 114 surveyed communities. Fortunately, the 
selected communities reflect a broad range of sizes and socio-economic conditions. 
                                                 
23 In alternative specifications I also included the number of siblings who ever migrated 
to the U.S. previous to the current period. This produced no significant changes.  
24 The use of individuals’ observed immigration status would be inappropriate, as 
applying for U.S. immigration documentation is an endogenous choice. 
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Comparison of the MMP to a nationally representative survey has shown a high degree of 
accordance (Massey and Durand 2005). The sole major bias seems to be its geographic 
focus, which has favored western Mexican states (other regions have been added more 
recently).  
Representativeness within the communities themselves is often difficult to 
achieve when communities experience significant out-migration. The MMP takes various 
steps to deal with this problem: first, MMP staff conducts interviews in Mexico during 
the winter months when migrants traditionally return; second, spouses frequently remain 
in Mexico and are interviewed in the absence of the household head; and third, emigrated 
households are tracked by “snowball sampling” techniques and interviews with them are 
conducted in the U.S. In this respect, the MMP data are preferable to census or similar 
survey data that focus only on one location and hence either miss all current migrants or 
else miss all “stayers” and former migrants.  
 
5. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF MEXICAN MIGRATION BEHAVIOR 
I use two reduced-form equations to examine econometrically Mexicans’ 
migration behavior. Equation (2a) is a linear probability model that models decisions 
regarding whether or not to migrate (extensive migration behavior). Equation (2b) models 
the migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation from Mexico to the U.S. (intensive 
migration behavior): 
 
(2a) E E E MX E US E E E Eit 1 t 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 t t itPr(ME =1) = α +β l +β w +β w +β n +β g +γ X +u   
(2b) I I I MX I US I I I Iit 1 t 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 t t itIMI = α +β l +β w +β w +β n +β g +γ X +u , 
21 
 
where MEit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if individual i starts a new 
undocumented U.S. trip in year t and zero otherwise, IMIit measures individual i’s 
migration intensity in year t, α is an intercept term, βi are the parameters to be estimated, 
lt is a measure of U.S. border enforcement, wit MX and wit US are predicted real wage rates 
in Mexico and the U.S., respectively, nit is a measure of migration networks, gt indicates 
the availability of visas, Xt is a vector of additional macroeconomic controls (for a 
description, see Table C.2 in Appendix C), and uit is an error term.  
To account for unobserved cross-person differences, such as deviating abilities or 
tastes, I include “individual fixed effects:”  
 
(2c)  
 
where ωi is a constant term that captures time-invariant cross-person differences and εit is 
an independent and identically distributed error term. Ideally, I would also include year 
dummy variables to better control for unobserved changes over time, but the fact that the 
measure of U.S. border enforcement varies only across time precludes this. As a second-
best alternative, I include several macroeconomic control variables and correct the error 
terms for clustering at the year level.  
 
it i itu =ω +ε ,
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6. THE DETERMINANTS OF EXTENSIVE MIGRATION BEHAVIOR 
Table 1 presents the results of different regressions that implement equation (2a), 
which models the choice as to whether or not to migrate illegally. Column one starts with 
an ordinary least square (OLS) regression that estimates the effect of U.S. border 
enforcement without controlling for the effects of other variables. Column two also 
controls for predicted earnings in both countries. Columns three and four further include 
migration networks, the number of green cards granted to Mexicans, the change in the 
Mexican CPI, and time-invariant individual control variables.25 Columns five onward use 
individual fixed effects instead of the time-invariant individual control variables, and 
columns six through eight test different instruments for border enforcement.  
The results indicate that increases in U.S. border enforcement do not deter 
Mexicans from migrating illegally. Only in the uncontrolled OLS specification (column 
one) does greater U.S. border enforcement (slightly) reduce Mexicans’ propensity to 
migrate illegally. In all other specifications, including the IV estimations,26 the estimated 
coefficient of border enforcement is positive, implying that stricter border controls have a 
perverse effect: they stimulate more illegal migration.  
While highly statistically significant throughout, the estimated effect of border 
enforcement is rather small, with an estimated point elasticity at the sample mean of 0.19 
                                                 
25 I include indicators for individuals’ age, sex, educational attainment, marital status, and 
land and business ownership.  
26 All first stage results are reported in Table C.2 in Appendix C. I find that the political 
clout variables are the weakest instruments. Unlike other authors (Angelucci 2005; 
Carrion and Sorensen 2006; Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), I do not find marked 
differences between OLS and IV estimation results. In particular there are no indications 
that OLS underestimates border enforcement’s deterrence effect. 
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to 0.31 (see columns five to eight). Put differently, hiring 1,000 additional U.S. border 
patrol officers – that is, adding 904,000 line-watch hours27 – increases a Mexican’s 
probability to migrate illegally by 0.15 to 0.23 percent. Given the population of potential 
Mexican migrants, this translates into an estimated 34,000 to 50,000 increase in the 
annual volume of illegal Mexican migration.28 As discussed in the following sections, the 
reason for this perverse effect is that Table 1 shows border enforcement’s net impact: the 
reported coefficient of border enforcement is not purged of border enforcement’s indirect 
stimulation effect, resulting from its impact on intensive migration behavior.  
In accordance with expectations, predicted real U.S. wages exert a significant pull 
effect on Mexicans. The estimated point elasticity of undocumented migration with 
respect to U.S. wages, when controlling for individual heterogeneity, ranges from 0.6 to 
1.25. An increase in predicted real Mexican wages deters undocumented migration, with 
a smaller point elasticity of -0.36. Given that Mexican wages are quite low compared to 
U.S. wages – in 2004, the Mexican minimum wage rate per day was less than the U.S. 
federal minimum wage rate per hour – the binational wage gap is relatively little affected 
by marginal changes in Mexican wages. Also in accordance with expectations, I find that 
migration networks significantly raise the likelihood of undocumented migration, 
supporting the hypothesis that assistance furnished by social networks facilitates 
migration. Mexicans’ propensity to migrate illegally seems little affected by Mexico’s 
inflation rate or by the number of available green cards.  
                                                 
27 In 2004, 10,727 border patrol officers performed 9.7 million line-watch hours, giving 
an average of about 904 line-watch hours per officer and year. This is about half the 
figure used by Angelucci (2005), who does not correct for non-line watch activities.  
28 To approximate the population of potential migrants, I use the International Labor 
Organization’s census-based estimate of the average size of Mexico’s labor force during 
the sample period (22.17 million), available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/.  
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Table 1: The Determinants of Mexicans’ Propensity to Migrate Illegally  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE
-0.0015 0.0004 0.0034 0.0030 0.0020 0.0017 0.0019 0.0025
(0.0002)*** (0.0006) (0.0006)*** (0.001)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0009)** (0.0006)***
-0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0018
(0.0010)** (0.0009)** (0.001)** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0006)***
0.0506 0.0423 0.0415 0.0144 0.0134 0.0140 0.0297
(0.0084)*** (0.0088)*** (0.010)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0054)** (0.0062)** (0.0087)***
0.0542 0.0541 0.0323 0.0325 0.0324 0.0378
(0.0032)*** (0.003)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0067)***
8.9867 8.6423 1.1784 0.7786 1.0096 3.4641
(4.3516)** (4.465)* (2.8537) (3.0817) (3.1685) (3.2383)
0.1760 0.1687 0.0442 0.0374 0.0420 0.0364 
(0.0699)** (0.070)** (0.0374) (0.0347) (0.0517) (0.0386)
LWH Instrumented Pol. Majority Pol. Majority DEA Budget Pol. Clout
Add. Individual Controls YES YES
Individual Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 362160 354350 346545 346545 346545 346545 346545 290392
R-squared 0 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31
Elasticity of Enforcement -0.14 0.04 0.35 0.42 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.31
Elasticity of Mexican Wages -0.43 -0.39 -0.38 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.29
Elasticity of U.S. Wages 2.22 1.90 1.97 0.66 0.61 0.64 1.25
∆ ME if +1,000 BP Officers -0.0014 0.0004 0.0031 0.0028 0.0018 0.0015 0.0017 0.0023
∆ Migrants if +1,000 BPO -30063 8017 68142 60969 40083 34071 38079 50104
Border Enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
Predicted Mexican Wages 
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands)
Predicted U.S. Wages 
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands)
Migration Networks
(# of parents ever in US)
Mexican Inflation 
(annual change in CPI * 10^3 )
Green Cards 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. All 
elasticities are predicted point elasticities at the sample mean. The last two rows estimate the effect of hiring 1,000 additional border patrol officers (904,000 line-
watch hours) on probability to migrate illegally and on flow of illegal migration, respectively; WDI estimate of male Mexican working-age population was used 
to approximate population of potential migrants. For a description of the variables and the first stage results see Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C, respectively. 
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Robustness Tests  
Additional specifications to test the robustness of these results are reported in 
Table 2. I first check whether U.S. border enforcement might have a non-linear effect, by 
including squared line-watch hours. The estimated coefficient of the quadratic term is 
statistically significant, but the inflection point is beyond the sample range, indicating no 
reversal of the net stimulation effect (column one). Using a regional border enforcement 
measure as a substitute for line-watch hours causes the results to change very little 
(column two). Since previous studies generally have relied on wage or income indexes, I 
replace my predicted income variables with two commonly used indexes: a real index of 
earnings in Mexican manufacturing, from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía 
e Informática, and real earnings in U.S. manufacturing, from the U.S. Department of 
Labor. Border enforcement’s coefficient remains unaffected (column three).  
To test whether unobserved shocks affect the results, I include as additional 
macroeconomic control variables the U.S. and Mexican unemployment rates, the 
Mexican GDP growth rate, and a dummy variable indicating whether the IRCA was 
enacted. The estimated coefficients remain fairly stable, with slightly stronger positive 
effects of border enforcement and U.S. wages. Next, I include year dummies, dropping 
all person-invariant variables, using the regional border enforcement measure, and first 
differencing all independent variables to reduce multicollinearity (column five). None of 
the estimated coefficients changes sign, but border enforcement’s coefficient loses 
statistical significance, presumably due to remaining multicollinearity.29  
                                                 
29 In levels, regional border enforcement’s variance inflation factor (VIF) is 20.67. Once I 
first difference the VIF drops to 12.95. 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Mexicans’ Propensity to Migrate Illegally (Additional Specifications)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Wages
Non-Linear Regional Wage-Index Macro
OLS-IFE OLS-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE OLS-IFE,TE Probit IV-Probit Cond. Logit
Border Enforcement 0.0143 0.0015 0.0039 0.0023 0.0019 0.0256
(millions of line-watch hours) (0.0044)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0004)*** (0.001)** (0.0023)*** 
Regional Enforcement 0.0056 0.0086
(millions of enforcement hours) (0.0012)*** (0.0083)
Border Enforcement squared -0.0011
(millions of line-watch hours^2) (0.0004)***
Predicted Mexican Wages -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0073 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0328
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands) (0.0008)** (0.0006)*** (0.0008)** (0.0027)** (0.001)** (0.0008)*** (0.0028)*** 
Predicted U.S. Wages 0.0291 0.0245 0.0437 0.3038 0.0267 0.0259 0.1335
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands) (0.0077)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0300)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0174)*** 
Migration Networks 0.0307 0.0383 0.0318 0.0330 0.0413 0.0217 0.0217 0.1100
(# of parents ever in US) (0.0069)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0163)** (0.0019)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0381)*** 
Green Cards 0.9739 3.0062 1.8268 3.7266 6.5850 6.3088 4.4271
(millions granted to Mexicans) (2.6922) (3.3713) (3.0943) (5.8986) (2.740)** (2.895)** (18.5770)
Mexican Inflation 0.0648 0.0259 -0.0005 0.0204 0.1233 0.1161 0.3680
(annual change in CPI * 10^3 ) (0.0482) (0.0355) (0.0211) (0.0553) (0.0500)*** (0.050)** (0.1000)*** 
MX Manufacturing Earnings -0.0345
(real index) (0.0449)
U.S. Manufacturing Earnings 0.0306
(constant 2000 Dollars) (0.0349)
LWH Instrumented YES YES YES
Individual Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Individual Controls YES YES
Additional Macro Controls YES
Year Dummies YES
Observations 346545 295614 353404 313842 276909 346545 346545 69339
Enforcement Elasticity 0.25 0.34 0.15 0.30 0.02 0.43 0.36 0.11
Enforcement Changes across Time
Year Dummies
Discrete Probability Models
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. Regional enforcement is 
millions of total enforcement hours per year and Mexican state (see Appendix A-II). Additional controls are listed in Table C.2. In column 5 all independent variables are in first 
differences. Columns 6 to 8 use a probit, probit IV and Chamberlain's (1980) conditional fixed effect specification, respectively; marginal effects at mean and standard errors are 
shown. IV regressions use political majority instruments. 
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Probit specifications, equivalent to the OLS and IV specifications without 
individual fixed effects in Table 1, produce very similar estimates for marginal effects, 
statistical significance levels and point elasticities (columns six to eight).30 The main 
difference is that the impact of predicted Mexican wages increases by about one-fourth.31 
Finally, my results are robust to a reduction of the recall period to a maximum of fifteen 
years (see Table C.5 in Appendix C).  
 
7. THE DETERMINANTS OF INTENSIVE MIGRATION BEHAVIOR 
I now turn to the determinants of migration intensity, that is, migrants’ degree of 
socio-economic reorientation from their place of origin, as measured by the IMI. Column 
one of Table 3 reports a simple OLS regression that includes line-watch hours and 
predicted real wages in the U.S. and Mexico. Column two adds migration networks, the 
number of green cards granted to Mexicans, and the Mexican inflation rate. Columns 
three onward include individual fixed effects, and columns four and five instrument line-
watch hours.  
                                                 
30 Since the decision whether or not to migrate is a discrete choice, a linear probability 
model is an approximation. I have used linear probability models because, in this case, no 
unbiased discrete choice model exists that can control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. 
31 Results from logit regressions were very similar to the probit results. Column eight 
uses Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional fixed effects logit model. Border enforcement’s 
predicted point elasticity remains positive but is close to zero (0.11). Due to 
Chamberlain’s conditioning procedure all observations of life-time stayers - about 80 
percent - have to be dropped, making a comparison to the other results difficult.  
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Table 3: The Determinants of Mexican Migration Intensity 
 
1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS OLS-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE
0.0391 0.0427 0.0241 0.0273 0.0318
(0.0022)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0056)***
-0.0113 -0.0085 -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0029
(0.0012)*** (0.0070) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0025)
0.4203 0.4482 0.0639 0.0725 0.0639
(0.0100)*** (0.0411)*** (0.0264)** (0.0334)** (0.0228)***
0.1633 0.2068 0.2032 0.1823
(0.0145)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0246)*** (0.0257)***
0.3552 0.1575 0.1621 0.1351
(0.0285)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0319)*** (0.0296)***
2.2271 0.6070 0.6684 0.5717
(0.5754)*** (0.3437)* (0.3787)* (0.3689)
Indiviudal Dummies YES YES YES
LWH Instrumented YES YES
Observations 24948 24948 24948 24948 21371
R-squared 0.26 0.41 0.82 0.85 0.86
Elasticity of Enforcement 4.58 5.08 2.87 3.24 2.47
Elasticity of Mexican Wages -2.11 -1.59 -0.58 -0.49 -0.32
Elasticity of U.S. Wages 26.14 27.67 3.94 4.47 2.24
∆ IMI if ∆-SD in LWH (#) 21.75% 23.75% 13.40% 15.18% 17.69%
First Stage:
0.7359
(0.3712)*
0.0566
(0.4021)
4.4387
(0.751)*** 
0.0058
(0.0006)***
R-squared 0.85 0.85
DEA Budget
(const. 2000 Dollars, millions)
Border Enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
Predicted Mexican Wages 
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands)
Predicted U.S. Wages 
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands)
Migration Networks
(# of parents ever in US)
Green Cards 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
Mexican Inflation 
(annual change in CPI )
President Republican
(past period)
Senate Majority Republican 
(past period)
House Majority Republican 
(past period)
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. All elasticities are predicted point elasticities at sample 
mean. (#) Normalized change in IMI: change in IMI due to standard deviation increase in border 
enforcement divided by IMI’s standard deviation. First stage regressions include all regressors from second 
stage. For a description of the variables see Table C.1. 
 
Consistently across all specifications, an increase in U.S. border enforcement 
results in a sizable and statistically highly significant increase in migration intensity. In 
other words, it leads to greater socio-economic reorientation of migrants from Mexico to 
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the U.S. The magnitude of this intensification effect falls once I control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, suggesting cross-person differences, but it remains strong and 
indeed increases slightly once line-watch hours are instrumented. Mexicans’ intensive 
migration behavior appears to be more sensitive to changes in U.S. border enforcement 
than extensive migration behavior. The IMI’s predicted point elasticity with respect to 
border enforcement, evaluated at the sample mean, is quite high: between 2.9 and 3.2, 
when controlling for individual hetereogeneity. Table 3 also reports marginal changes in 
the IMI, normalized by the IMI’s own standard deviation. If border enforcement 
increases by one standard deviation, this causes a normalized IMI change of 13.4 to 17.7 
percent.  
An increase in Mexican wages reduces the IMI, but the effect is small.32 Higher 
U.S. wages lead to a greater detachment of migrants. A one standard deviation increase in 
predicted real U.S. wages results in a normalized IMI change of 12 to 14 percent, 
comparable to the effect of border enforcement. Nuclear migration networks have a 
strong intensification effect: having one parent in the U.S. raises normalized IMI by 
about 55 percent. The availability of long-term visas increases the IMI, while the 
availability of short-term visas lowers it (see Table C.5 in Appendix C). These findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that long-term visas’ main impact is to improve 
migrants’ foreign quality-of-life, while short-term visas’ main impact is to ease travel 
restrictions, impacts that increase and decrease migrants’ detachment from their place of 
origin, respectively. 
 
                                                 
32 Moreover, the effect is statistically significant only if the standard errors are not 
corrected for clustering at the year level (not shown). 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Mexican Migration Intensity (Additional Specifications)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Regional
Measure
Macro
Controls
% Time in 
U.S.
U.S. House 
Index
% Dependents 
in U.S.
U.S. Visa Emigrant
Active 
Migrant
First-Time 
Migrant
IV-IFE IV-IFE OLS-TE OLS-IFE,TE IV-IFE Mult. Logit IV-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE IV
0.0230 0.0270 0.0094 0.0375 0.0354 0.0906 0.0597 0.0089
(0.0043)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0107)*** (0.004)**
0.0620 0.2860 0.0129
(0.0195)*** (0.1250)* (0.0242)
-0.0050 0.0003 -0.0364 -0.0115 -0.0028 -0.0020 0.0015 -0.0065 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0049
(0.0027)* (0.0031) (0.0097)*** (0.0023)*** (0.0058) (0.0011)* (0.0028) (0.0037)* (0.0094) (0.0053) (0.003)
0.0324 0.1648 0.7780 0.3693 0.1270 0.0770 0.0114 0.0261 0.1115 0.0181 0.2692
(0.0391) (0.0398)*** (0.0510)*** (0.0373)*** (0.0339)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0358) (0.0497) (0.0696) (0.0377) (0.024)*** 
0.1862 0.1395 0.1150 0.1215 0.1684 0.0416 0.1934 0.2018 0.2112 0.1828 0.0850
(0.0293)*** (0.0262)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0284)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0304)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0394)*** (0.0294)*** (0.007)*** 
0.1104 0.0694 0.1115 0.0713 0.1905 0.2497 0.4619 0.2879 0.1794
(0.0348)*** (0.0384)* (0.0338)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0304)*** (0.0510)*** (0.0893)*** (0.0550)*** (0.031)*** 
0.1233 -0.0791 0.8712 0.3450 0.6874 0.9757 2.4551 1.200 1.4739
(0.3611) (0.2150) (0.3839)** (0.0681)*** (0.4099) (0.5808) (1.0650)** (0.600)* (0.247)*** 
Additional Macro Controls YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Individual Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
LWH Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 18462 19653 18462 18462 24948 24948 24948 24948 2861 10597 5253
∆ IMI if ∆-SD in LWH (#) 8.32% 12.21% 43.73% 1.97% 13.77% - 29.84% 17.45% 50.26% 26.07% 7.59%
"Migrant Types"Decomposition: Dependent Variable is
Mexican Inflation 
(annual change in CPI * 10^3)
Predicted Mexican Wages 
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands)
Predicted U.S. Wages 
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands)
Migration Networks
(# of parents ever in US)
Green Cards 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
Changes over Time
Year Dummies
Regional Enforcement 
(millions of enforcement hours)
Enforcement
Border Enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. Regional enforcement is 
millions of total enforcement hours per year and Mexican state (see Appendix A-II). Additional macro controls are listed in Table C.1. In columns 5 to 8 IMI indicators are 
independent variables (see Table C.1). Column 6 is a multinomial logit regression and reports estimated marginal effects and standard errors (evaluated at sample mean) that 
individuals choose U.S. house ownership (no ownership is base outcome). Columns 9, 10 and 11 include only observations of individuals whose household is in the U.S., who 
have made a U.S. trip in the current period, or whose first U.S. trip is no more than five years ago, respectively. All IV regressions use political majority instruments. (#) 
Normalized change in IMI: change in IMI due to standard deviation increase in border enforcement divided by IMI’s standard deviation (columns 5 to 8 refer to respective IMI 
indicator). 
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Robustness Tests 
Table 4 reports the results of additional tests. The first column replaces line-watch hours 
with the regional border enforcement measure. Border enforcement’s effect is somewhat reduced 
but still strong and statistically significant. To control for possible shocks, additional 
macroeconomic control variables are included in column two. Border enforcement’s 
intensification effect remains significant, but the coefficient of Mexican wages becomes 
negligible. Next, I include year dummies, drop all person-invariant variables, and use the regional 
border enforcement measure. Border enforcement’s coefficient remains statistically significant 
and strong, as long as I do not simultaneously include individual fixed effects (see column three). 
Once individual fixed effects are added, border enforcement’s coefficient becomes insignificant 
(see column four), which is not surprising.33 The results also are robust to a restriction of 
migrants’ recall period and remain valid if I do not use the MMP’s sampling weights (see Table 
C.5 in Appendix C, columns eight and nine, respectively).34 
 
Decomposing Migrants’ Intensive Migration Behavior 
Different aspects of migrants’ socio-economic reorientation may have distinct trajectories. 
For example, in response to tighter border controls migrants might cut back on home-time 
consumption but continue to invest, or even invest more, at home. The IMI summary measure 
                                                 
33 Enforcement hours progress highly collinear across regions over time. Once I control for 
different starting levels, by including fixed effects, almost no variation remains. 
34 The reason for the coefficients’ decrease once I do not use the MMP’s sampling weights is a 
reduction of the IMI’s sample variation by three-fourths. As it is costlier to interview emigrants, 
the MMP samples fewer emigrants but weights them more strongly to achieve better 
representativeness. Since emigrants are high-intensity migrants, the right tail of the IMI’s 
sampling distribution is effectively deflated if no weighting is used. 
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could conceal such differential trajectories. To examine this possibility, I decompose the IMI into 
its four components and use these individually as dependent variables (columns five to eight in 
Table 4). The previous findings map closely to each of the IMI components: not only are the 
signs of all coefficients identical and their levels of statistical significance comparable, but the 
coefficients’ relative magnitudes are also similar. 35,36 This strong correspondence vindicates the 
use of the IMI. 
The decomposed estimations again suggest that the tripling of line-watch hours during the 
1990s led to a considerable socio-economic reorientation of migrants to the U.S.: it induced 
Mexican migrant household heads to move one-fourth of their family dependents to the U.S., 
elevated their total U.S. time by 18 percent, reinforced their efforts to obtain a long-term visa by 
23 percent, and increased their likelihood of acquiring a U.S. house by 6 percent. 37  
 
Border Enforcement’s Impact on Remittances  
 
The MMP database does not include data on migrants’ remittances that vary across both time and 
individuals.38 To examine how border enforcement affects migrants’ remittance sending 
                                                 
35 Columns five, seven, and eight use IV estimation and include individual fixed effects. As the 
house index may take on three discrete values – Mexican ownership, no ownership, and U.S. 
ownership – column six implements a multinomial logit model with three choices (see Greene 
2005, Equation 21-45). The base outcome is “no ownership;” that is, all shown results are relative 
to the “no ownership” case. I report estimated marginal effects, evaluated at the sample mean 
(average marginal effects were very similar), and associated standard errors. 
36 The only exceptions to this strong correspondence are the parameter estimates of the wage 
variables in column seven. 
37 To obtain these estimates, I multiply each component’s marginal effect with respect to border 
enforcement (reported in columns 5 to 8) by the increase in line-watch hours in the 1990s (6.5 
million).  
38 The lack of both time- and person-variant information is also the reason why the IMI that I 
have used throughout was constructed without including a remittance indicator, despite the fact 
that migrants’ remittance sending behavior was found to be correlated to the other IMI indicators 
in a cross-section of Mexican migrants (see Kaufmann 2008a). 
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behavior, I thus construct a cross-sectional sample, using information on migrants’ remittances 
from their last U.S. trip. Table C.4 in Appendix C then reports the results of different 
econometric specifications that examine the effects of border enforcement, and other commonly 
included variables, on migrants’ decision whether to remit or not (columns 1 and 2) and the 
proportion of income remitted (columns 3 to 6). I find that border enforcement reduces both 
migrants’ probability to remit and the proportion of income migrants remit. Border enforcement’s 
impact is most significant for the amount remitted, in terms of both the magnitude of the marginal 
effect and the level of statistical significance. The results further suggest that the tripling of line-
watch hours in the 1990s reduced migrants’ probability to remit by 4 to 8 percent and decreased 
the amount of income they sent by 12 to 17 percent.  
 
“Migrant-Type” Differences  
Changes in U.S. immigration policies may affect the migration behavior of different 
“migrant types” differently. In particular, increases in border enforcement may have a stronger 
intensification effect on high-intensity migrants, for whom further detachment may be 
comparatively more appealing than abandonment of migration. Columns nine to eleven of Table 
4 report regression results that use sub-samples of migrant types: “emigrants” whose household is 
in the U.S.; “active” migrants who started a U.S. trip in the current period; and “first-time 
migrants” whose first U.S. trip happened during the last five years. For emigrants, border 
enforcement’s intensification effect is almost four times higher than in the overall sample; for 
active migrants, it is double; and for first-time migrants, the intensification effect is 42 percent 
lower than in the overall sample. 
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8. ACCOUNTING FOR BORDER ENFORCEMENT’S INDIRECT STIMULATION OF 
ILLEGAL MIGRATION 
In Mexican communities with high out-migration rates, the incomes of “stayers” – 
residents who stay in Mexico – depend not only on their own economic activity but also on 
migrants’ remittances and migrants’ economic activity at home, including consumption and 
investment. In such a setting, the intensification of migration strategies in response to increased 
border enforcement could importantly impact on stayers’ incomes, and this in turn could thus 
induce more community members to migrate. This would provide a plausible explanation for the 
perverse effect of border enforcement reported above (section six). To test whether border 
enforcement exerts an indirect stimulation effect via this pathway, and if so, to quantify its 
magnitude, I construct a community-level indicator of migrants’ average degree of detachment 
from the community of origin (“average community IMI”): I calculate village-year averages of 
predicted individual IMI values and lag them to account for time delays.39 To disentangle border 
enforcement’s direct and indirect effects, I include average community IMI as a regressor in 
addition to line-watch hours and the other control variables and reproduce the main regressions 
from section six. The results are reported in Table 5.40  
 
                                                 
39 Specification three of Table 3 was used for prediction. I use predicted IMI values to avoid 
endogeneity with border enforcement. I tried different lags of the predicted average community 
IMI variable. I found that an average of two to six-year lags gave best results and used this in the 
regressions reported here. 
40 One might be concerned about reverse causality; that is, that extensive migration behavior 
might drive intensive migration behavior. This is not likely to be a problem in this specification, 
however, for two reasons. First, average community IMI is lagged but ME is not. Second, ME is 
an individual-level variable, but average community IMI is a community average. It seems 
unlikely that the choice of one individual would have a noticeable impact on a community 
aggregate. 
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Table 5: Mexicans’ Propensity to Migrate Illegally: Accounting for Border Enforcement’s 
Direct and Indirect Effect  
1 2 3 4
IV-IFE OLS-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE
0.0019 0.0012 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0009)** (0.0004)*** (0.0008) (0.0008)
-0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0023
(0.0008)*** (0.0008)** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)***
0.0140 0.0226 0.0213 0.0446
(0.0062)** (0.0063)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0111)***
0.0324 0.0306 0.0310 0.0327
(0.0070)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0075)***
1.0096 -1.7377 -3.2640 -6.5871
(3.1685) (2.7008) (2.8396) (3.7630)*
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
0.0751 0.0862 0.0700
(0.0176)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0214)***
LWH Instrumented YES YES YES
Additional Macro Controls YES
Individual Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 346545 327734 327734 299126
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30
Net Impact of Border Enforcement:
∆ ME if +1,000 BPO (†) 0.00172 0.00272 0.00224 0.00180
∆ Migrants if +1,000 BPO (+) 35,211 55,780 45,912 36,823
Average Community IMI   
(predicted, lagged)
Border Enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
Predicted Mexican Wages 
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands)
Predicted U.S. Wages 
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands)
Migration Networks
(# of parents ever in U.S.)
Green Cards 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
Mexican Inflation 
(annual change in CPI )
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust to clustering at year level. (†) and (+) estimate the net impact of hiring 1,000 additional U.S. border patrol 
officers on the probability to migrate illegally and on the flow of illegal Mexican migration for sample period, 
respectively (see also footnote 28); for calculation of indirect effect see text. All IV regressions use real budget of 
DEA as instrument. For description of variables see Table C.2 in Appendix C.  
 
Consistently, I find that an increase in migrants’ detachment from their community of 
origin – which heightened border enforcement induces, as shown in the previous section – 
significantly raises fellow community members’ future propensity to migrate illegally. In other 
words, the empirical evidence supports the existence of an indirect stimulation channel operating 
through the effect of border enforcement on intensive migration behavior; that is, migrants’ 
heightened detachment from home puts greater pressure on “stayers” to migrate, too, most 
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plausibly due to a reduction of migrants’ remittances and economic activity at home, and 
associated negative multiplier effects. According to the estimates reported in column three, for 
example, the addition of 1,000 U.S. border patrol officers (0.904 million line-watch hours) raised 
individuals’ predicted IMI by 0.0218 (0.904 x 0.0241; see column 3 in Table 3), which indirectly 
increased fellow community members’ propensity to migrate illegally by 0.188 percent (0.0218 x 
0.0862), and thus indirectly added about 41,600 undocumented migrants per year (0.00188 x 
22.17 million; see footnote 28). 
Once border enforcement’s indirect channel is accounted for, by controlling for average 
community IMI, the coefficient on border enforcement becomes statistically indistinguishable 
from zero in the instrumental variables, individual fixed-effects estimates. The finding in section 
six that U.S. border enforcement increases illegal migration can thus be attributed to border 
enforcement’s adverse impact on migrants’ average degree of detachment from the community of 
origin.  
 
9. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Department of Homeland Security estimated in 2006 that the costs of hiring, training, 
and equipping one additional border patrol agent were $187,955 per year (cited in Mulhausen 
2006; see also CBO 2006). Hiring 14,000 additional U.S. border patrol agents, as proposed by the 
Senate Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits and Security Act of 2007 (“AgJOBS”), would 
thus cost $2.6 billion in the hiring year and would create annual expenditures likely to be around 
$1.2 billion in subsequent years. Proponents might consider this policy to be worth the expense if 
its promised goal - deterrence of illegal migration - were achieved. The econometric results 
presented in this paper suggest that this will not be the case. On the contrary, my estimations 
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suggest that this escalation of border enforcement will induce between 735,000 and 1,081,000 
Mexicans per year to migrate illegally.41, In the 1990s, a period during which “only” 5,345 of the 
proposed 14,000 border patrol officers were added, the net increase in the stock of undocumented 
Mexican migrants in the U.S. was on average 300,000 per year (Passel and Suro 2005; DHS 
2007); the increase in the gross inflow, that is, before subtracting the outflow of migrants, was 
likely even higher.42 This suggests that the magnitude of the estimated increase is plausible. 43 
My estimation results from Table 4 suggest that the addition of 14,000 U.S. border patrol 
agents would further induce Mexican migrants to move half of their family dependents to the 
U.S., expand their total U.S. time by 34 percent, intensify their efforts to obtain a long-term visa 
by 45 percent, and increase their likelihood of acquiring a U.S. home by 12 percent. Researchers 
have long noted that once migrants settle, reunify with their family, and legalize, their 
remittances will drop (e.g., Lucas 2005). If a significant part of the current $23 billion in annual 
remittances – equivalent to 2 million full-time annual salaries at the official Mexican minimum 
wage rate44 – were to disappear, as my regression results above suggest, a substantial increase in 
the volume of illegal Mexican migration could be a plausible consequence.  
                                                 
41 I multiply my estimate of the current pool of potential migrants – the ILO’s most recent 
census-based estimate of the size of Mexico’s labor force (34.15 million) – with the predicted net 
increase in the propensity to migrate illegally due to the addition of 12.66 million line-watch 
hours (between 0.0017 x 12.66 and 0.0025 x 12.66; see Tables 1 and 5).  
42 Indeed, according to Espenshade’s (1995) method for measuring the gross inflow of 
undocumented migrants – for which I combine INS data on the number of border apprehensions 
and MMP data on the annual average probability to be apprehended – an average of 2.5 million 
undocumented Mexicans entered the U.S. per year in the 1990ies. 
43 The estimations should be taken with a grain of salt, however. First, they assume that the 
inherent propensity to migrate illegally of the average potential migrant does not change as more 
Mexicans migrate. Second, due to the immense increase in border enforcement, linear 
extrapolation might be inadequate. Third, migrants’ detachment may reach an upper boundary 
(e.g., “emigration”), at with which point additional border enforcement does not cause additional 
migration stimuli. 
44 The Mexican Central Bank states that the 2005 federal daily minimum wage was 45.24 pesos, 
corresponding to about 5.7 purchasing-power-corrected U.S. dollars. 
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 U.S. border enforcement thus backfires with respect to its main policy goal. In addition, it 
is likely to provoke other unwanted consequences, such as reducing transfers that benefit the 
Mexican society (e.g., remittances), but increasing the volume and permanency of detrimental 
outflows in human, financial and political capital.45 This suggests that a profound rethinking of 
U.S. migration management is in order. When designing immigration policies and visa programs, 
policy makers may wish to consider their effects on migrants’ degree of socio-economic 
reorientation. Some of the recent proposals for “immigration reform” have included provisions 
for an expansion of guest-worker programs. Such programs, that facilitate cross-border mobility 
and seem less prone to cause detachment, might be the preferred short-term policy from both the 
U.S. and Mexican perspectives. In the longer run, a reduction in the volume of Mexican 
migration seems most likely if U.S. migration management takes a broader perspective and 
supports the Mexican government in providing better economic opportunities for Mexicans at 
home. In this respect, the European Union’s support for the convergence of the development 
levels of its member states may offer useful lessons.  
 
10. SUMMARY  
External border enforcement has been the main pillar of U.S. migration management in 
the recent decades, and there are no signs that this will change in the near future (CRS 2006). 
This study finds that further escalation of U.S. border enforcement is an ill-advised policy that is 
likely to yield perverse effects, contrary to the goals of U.S. policy makers as well as to the 
prospects for Mexico’s economic development. Controlling for individual heterogeneity, 
macroeconomic shocks, and endogeneity of border enforcement, I find that the net impact of U.S. 
                                                 
45 Eschbach et al. (2003) describe the human hardship that border enforcement causes. 
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border enforcement is to stimulate Mexicans’ propensity to migrate illegally. For example, I 
estimate that the tripling of U.S. border enforcement in the 1990s induced between 245,000 and 
360,000 Mexicans per year to migrate illegally. I attribute this striking result to border 
enforcement’s impact on migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation, and the adverse 
effects this has upon the sending communities. 
Using a summary measure of migrants’ degree of socio-economic reorientation, the Index 
of Migration Intensity (IMI), I find strong econometric evidence that stricter U.S. border 
enforcement causes a significantly greater detachment of Mexican migrants from their 
community of origin. I argue that such a development can spur new migration by suppressing 
stayers’ incomes from remittances, migrants’ economic activity at home, and associated 
multiplier effects. I find statistical support for the hypothesis that an increase in the community 
average IMI – which greater border enforcement increases – makes it more likely that fellow 
community members will migrate illegally. This effect largely accounts for the finding that the 
net impact of stricter border controls is to stimulate more illegal migration.  
I also find that an increase in predicted real U.S. wages induces both more illegal 
migration and greater socio-economic detachment from the origin. Higher predicted real Mexican 
wages deter illegal migration and reduce migrants’ detachment. This suggests that reducing the 
U.S. – Mexican wage gap may be the most promising long-term migration management 
technique. In the short term, guest-worker programs, which facilitate continuing attachment to the 
migrant’s place of origin, might be a desirable option. 
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APPPENDIX A: Mathematical Appendix 
1.) Optimal Migration Strategy 
 Table A.1: Optimal Migration Strategy  
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2.) Partial Derivatives of Optimal Migration Strategy 
A) Let X= (n, t, R, C, t*) be the optimal solution as defined in Table A.1. Then the partial 
derivates are (with superscripts suppressed):  
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where *w=w - w∆ , MD = t
1-
α+α and 
*1E w Ttα− δ= δ . Superscripts “a)”,”b)”, and ”c)” require that for 
the indicated sign to be valid, Condition A1-a, A1-b or A1-c holds, respectively.  
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Note: Numerical simulation suggests that Conditions A1 are very likely to hold for optimal 
migration strategies (see Appendix D-II in Kaufmann 2008b). 
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APPPENDIX B: Construction of Variables  
Regional Border Enforcement: 
I compute two-way frequency tables of destination and origin states. I find that on average 
three-fourths of all trips from a certain Mexican state destine to no more than two U.S. states. 
Hence, it appears reasonable to focus on each Mexican state’s two most favorite migration routes. 
I group the nine U.S. border enforcement zones into four regions – west, center-west, center-east, 
and east – and assess through which each state’s favorite migration routes pass, assuming that 
migrants prefer to take the shortest possible way once in the U.S (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C). 
I then use the breakdown of total enforcement hours into enforcement zones and year to calculate 
a weighted regionalized total enforcement measure for each Mexican state and year.46  
 
Predicted Real Wages in the U.S. and Mexico: 
I use MMP income data to run three independent Mincer regressions on monthly nominal 
wages (in logs) and then predict wages for each individual and year. All regressions include the 
following variables: age, gender, marital status, work experience (either U.S. or Mexican), work 
experience squared, educational and occupational dummies, and state and year dummies. I first 
predict Mexican wages, which is simple since both migrants and non-migrants report their most 
recent Mexican income. Next, I use migrants’ reported U.S. wages on their first and last U.S. trip 
to predict U.S. wages. For the MI panel, I need to predict U.S. wages for migrants only, which 
does not constitute a problem. Yet for the ME panel, I additionally need potential wages for non-
migrants, which are not observed. Hence, I run a standard two-stage selection model in which I 
first model the migration choice and then the U.S. income equation. As exclusion restriction I use 
a measure of rainfall in the individual’s state of origin. After prediction, I convert all wages into 
constant dollars or pesos of 2000.47 
 
 
                                                 
46 I weight the total enforcement hours of the two border regions through which the state’s two 
most popular migration routes pass by the routes’ frequency and sum them. 
47 When I form year averages, I find great accordance between my predicted U.S. wages and the 
DOL’s agricultural wages and between my predicted Mexican wages and the INEGI’s real index 
of wages in Mexican manufacturing (for definitions of wage series see Table C.2 in Appendix C). 
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APPENDIX C: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure C.1: Map of U.S. - Mexican Border Regions, Crossing Points, and Enforcement 
Zones 
 
Notes: Blue and yellow signs mark main border crossing points and center of U.S. enforcement zones, respectively.  
 
 
Google 
EarthTM 
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Table C.1: Econometric Studies Analyzing the Effect of U.S. Border Enforcement on the Flow of Illegal Mexican Migration 
 
Study
Author(s) Econometric Model Size Period Instruments US wages MX wages
Significant? Min Max Best
Angelucci (2005) Stay/ migrate
Linear probability 
model (OLS/ IV) 135,260
1972-
1993
Yes
(less) -0.025 -0.007 -0.013 Real DEA budget
[- 0.65, 
-1.26] Peso-wage (+) Wage-index (+/0)
Carrion & 
Sorensen (2006)
% village in 
U.S. state j
Nested logit model 
(OLS/ IV) 17,631
1976-
2001
Yes
(less) -0.93 1.09 -0.46
Border states' 
political clout
Gathmann 
(2004) Stay/ migrate
Linear probability 
model (OLS/ IV) 71,060
1978-
1998
No -0.012 -0.084 -0.021 Nominal budget of DEA
[-0.43, 
-3.05] Predicted wage (+)
Predicted 
wage (-)
Genicot & 
Senesky (2004) Stay/ Migrate
Cox's proportional 
hazard model 12,458
1967-
1995
No -0.121 0.005 --- Average  wage (0) Avgerage wage (0)
Hanson & 
Spilimbergo 
(2001)
# Appre-
hensions
OLS/ IV (Levels & 
First Differences)
342 1968-
1996
Yes
(less) 0.533 1.292 ---
Defense budget, 
elections, other
[-0.53, 
-1.292]
Peso-wage (0), 
dollar-wage (+/0)
Real wage (-), 
minimum wage (0)
Hanson & 
Spilimbergo 
(1999)
# Appre-
hensions
Bivariate Vector 
Autoregression 
240 1977-
1996
No 0.605 --- Real wage (+) Real wage (-)
Kossoudji (1992)
Duration in 
Mexico Duration model 1,860
1974-
1979
 Yes
(more) 0.362 ---
Orrenius& 
Zavodny (2003)
# Appre-
hensions
OLS/ IV (First 
Differences) 335
1969-
1996
Mixed –0.491 0.578* --- Defense budget, past enforcement
[-0.58, 
0.49]
Real wage (0), 
minimum wage (0)
Real wage (-/0), 
minimum wage (0)
Reyes et al. 
(2002) Stay/ migrate
2-stage model: logit 
(1st) & OLS (2nd)
11,241/ 
28 
1970- 
1998
No 0.17 
(a)
0.353
(a)
0.24
(a) ---
Richter et al. 
(2005)
% village 
that migrates 
Dynamic model 
(OLS) 1,759
1980-
2002
 Yes
(more)
0.011
--- +3.77
---
Dependent 
variable
---
Specification Data
Deterence 
Elasticity (at 
mean)
WagesU.S. Border Enforcement
Coefficient
Ratio of US & 
MX minimum wage
---
 
Notes: Column 6 reports if border enforcement’s coefficient was significant at 5% level and caused more or less migration. All studies use line-watch hours of U.S. border patrol 
agents, except Kossoudji and Richter et al. who use number of apprehensions and change in border patrol budget, respectively. Columns 9 and 10 report border enforcements’ 
estimated coefficient (may not be comparable across specifications); negative signs indicate deterrence (except for Hanson). (a) Reported results are from second stage. 
 47 
Table C.2: Determinants of Mexican Migration Behavior: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Category Description Mean SD Min Max
IMI: Index of Migration Intensity 0.03 0.37 -0.31 0.95
ME: Dummy if person starts new illegal U.S. trip in 
year t 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Line-watch hours of U.S. Border Patrol Agents at the 
Southern U.S. Border (*) 2.90 1.90 1.24 9.80
Predicted monthly wages in Mexico 
(in constant 2000 pesos, thousands) 4.16 3.16 0.30 45.95
Predicted monthly wages in U.S.  
(in constant 2000 dollars, thousands) 1.17 0.30 0.51 3.83
# of parents of migrant that have gone to U.S. before 
year t 0.10 0.33 0.00 2.00
Number of green cards availabe to Mexicans (*) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yearly change in Mexican CPI 38.79 35.03 4.55 131.83
Average 
Community 
IMI
Average of community members' predicted IMI in 
years t-2 to t-6 -0.09 0.14 -0.33 0.51
Proportion of  time spend in U.S. in 5 years 0.25 0.36 0.00 1.00
House index: house in Mexico (-1), no house (0), 
house in U.S. (1) -0.51 0.55 -1.00 1.00
Proportion of dependents that have gone to U.S. in 
last 3 years 0.11 0.27 0.00 1.00
Dummy of long-term U.S. immigration 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Alt. Enforce-
ment
Total enforcement hours of U.S. Border Patrol agents 
by year and Mexican state (*) (see Appendix A) 1.48 0.56 0.85 3.75
Index of real earnings in Mexican manufacturing 116.27 31.10 72.26 164.04
Weekly earnings in U.S. construction (in constant 
2000 dollars) 599.24 19.75 568.20 644.79
Non-immigrant visas granted to Mexicans (*) 1.50 0.87 0.36 4.45
Temporary worker permits granted to Mexicans (*) 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.14
Growth in Mexican real per capita GDP (index) 0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.06
Unemplyoment rate in Mexico (in percent) 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.08
Unemplyoment rate in U.S. (in percent) 6.60 1.35 3.97 9.71
Dummy if year is subsequent to IRCA 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Age of indiviudal 38.2 13.5 16.0 65.0
Sex of indiviudal (1= male; 2 = female) 1.15 0.36 1.00 2.00
Dummy if individual is married 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dummy: 6-8 years of education 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Dummy: 9-11 years of education 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Dummy:12-14 years of education 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00
Dummy: >14 years of education 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Hectars of land owned 2.10 36.77 0.00 3600
Number of businesses owned 0.15 0.39 0.00 4.00
Dependent
Variables
Baseline
Independent 
Variables
Alternative 
Visas
Alternative 
Wage
Additonal
 Macro 
Controls
Additional 
Individual-
Level 
Controls
IMI 
Indicators
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Table C.2: Determinants of Mexican Migration Behavior - Descriptive Statistics 
(Continued) 
 
Dummy if U.S.president was Republican in past 
period 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dummy if majority in Senate was Rebublicans in 
past period 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Dummy if majority in House of Representatives 
was Rebublican in year t-1 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Budget of DEA: Staffing and Appropriations - all 
sources (in constant 1995 dollars) (*) 676.09 341.05 237.70 1645.8
Number of Representatives from Southern border 
states in U.S. House of Representatives in year t 77.63 6.93 73.00 96.00
Highest within-party seniority of senators from 
Southern border states in year t 23.90 7.01 11.00 38.00
Number of Representatives from Southern border 
states in House approprations committee in year t 9.72 2.89 5.00 14.00
Number of Representatives  from Southern border 
states in House judicidary committee  in year t 7.61 1.40 6.00 10.00
Instruments
 for Border 
Enforcement
 
Notes: Statistics are based on ME panel, but are similar for MI panel. (*) Measured in millions. 
 
Table C.3: First Stage Regression Results for Extensive Migration Behavior 
Correpsonds to Table 5.1, Column No. 4 6 7 8
Political 
Majority
Political
Majority
DEA 
Budget
Political
Clout
0.3885 0.4698
(0.005)*** (0.359)
0.0014 -0.1393
(0.006) (0.359)
4.3065 4.1216
(0.007)*** (0.847)*** 
0.0051
(0.001)*** 
-0.1250
(0.025)*** 
0.7508
(0.096)*** 
-0.1894
(0.216)
0.3109
(0.256)
Observations 346545 346545 346545 290392
Adj. R-squared without instruments 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.10
Adj. R-squared with instruments 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.05
# Members in House Judiciary 
Committee (from border states)
House Majority Republican 
(past period)
DEA Budget 
(constant 2000 Dollars, millions)
Senate Seniority (of senior senator from 
border states)
Size of House Delegation 
(from border states)
President Republican
(past period)
Senate Majority Republican 
(past period)
# Members in House Appropriations 
Committee (from border states)
 
Notes: ***", "**", "*"  significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
line-watch hours. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. Regressions include 
all second stage regressors.  
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Table C.4 Remittance Behavior of Migrant Household Heads on Last U.S. Trip  
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.0176 -0.0362 -0.0138 -0.0169 -0.0178 -0.0232
(0.0145) (0.0176)** (0.0043)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0061)***
0.1558 0.1499 0.0328 0.0317 0.0380 0.0360
(0.0796)* (0.0796)* (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0295) (0.0295)
-0.0092 -0.0084 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0010
(0.0022)*** (0.0022)*** (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
-0.2038 -0.1914 -0.0329 -0.0310 -0.0490 -0.0457
(0.0620)*** (0.0624)*** (0.0187)* (0.0188) (0.0209)** (0.0211)**
-0.3972 -0.3767 -0.0695 -0.0665 -0.1025 -0.0974
(0.0786)*** (0.0794)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0242)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0273)***
-0.5526 -0.5367 -0.0560 -0.0533 -0.0940 -0.0893
(0.0943)*** (0.0947)*** (0.0309)* (0.0310)* (0.0351)*** (0.0352)**
-0.5560 -0.5451 -0.0108 -0.0093 -0.0403 -0.0377
(0.1377)*** (0.1378)*** (0.0470) (0.0471) (0.0531) (0.0531)
-0.1310 -0.1355 -0.0793 -0.0803 -0.0985 -0.1004
(0.1030) (0.1030) (0.0325)** (0.0325)** (0.0364)*** (0.0365)***
-0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0625 0.0595 0.0416 0.0415 0.0466 0.0466
(0.0700) (0.0699) (0.0217)* (0.0217)* (0.0243)* (0.0243)*
0.0044 0.0040 0.0012 0.0011 0.0016 0.0015
(0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)***
-0.0796 -0.2587 0.3497 0.3307 0.5203 0.4885
(0.9545) (0.9551) (0.2841) (0.2849) (0.3161)* (0.3170)
LWH instrumented YES YES YES
Observations 4533 4533 3492 3492 3492 3492
Marginal effect of border 
enforcement -0.004 -0.0083 -0.0138 -0.0169 -0.0123 -0.0160
Annual rainfall in state of 
origin 
Dummy if household owned a 
business prior to last US trip
Annual change in Mexican 
CPI 
Growth in Mexican real per 
capita GDP (index)
Migrant completed 9-11 years 
of education (dummy)
Migrant completed 12-14 
years of education (dummy)
Migrant completed >14 years 
of education (dummy)
% of  household members that 
are working
Border enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
Dummy if migrant is married
Age of migrant
Migrant completed 6-8 years 
of education (dummy)
Migrant send any 
remittances on last trip
Proportion of income remitted on last trip
OLS TobitProbit
 
Notes: “***,” “**,” and “*” significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table shows regression 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). All observations include dummies for migrants’ community of 
origin. IV regressions use political majority instruments. For a description of the variables see Table C.2. 
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Table C.5: Determinants of Mexican Migration Behavior: Additional Specification Tests 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
General Enforcement 
Non-Immig. Contract 15a Recall Non-lin. Non-Immig. Contract 15a Recall No Weights
IV-IFE OLS-IFE IV-IFE OLS-IFE IV-IFE OLS-IFE IV-IFE IV-IFE
0.0038 0.0051 0.0015 0.1504 0.0420 0.0411 0.0179 0.0112
(0.0013)*** (0.0019)** (0.0009)* (0.0224)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0034)***
-0.0115
(0.0019)***
-0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0036 -0.0050 -0.0026
(0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0024)** (0.0021)
0.0200 0.0153 0.0174 0.1632 0.0859 0.0684 0.0455 0.0709
(0.0071)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0085)** (0.0267)*** (0.0380)** (0.0272)** (0.0283) (0.0246)***
0.0318 0.0323 0.0336 0.1677 0.2014 0.2032 0.1450 0.1381
(0.0072)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0256)*** (0.0225)*** (0.0245)*** (0.0138)***
0.0790 3.2705 -4.2288 0.1207 0.1590 0.1639 0.1074 0.0929
(3.3130) (3.1674) (3.5998) (0.0310)*** (0.0328)*** (0.0319)*** (0.0285)*** (0.0202)***
0.0071 0.0048 -0.0020 0.4561 0.3764 0.5624 0.1810 0.3838
(0.0401 ) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.3137) (0.3722) (0.3553) (0.2870) (0.2034)*
-0.0053 -0.0422
(0.0029)* (0.0157)**
-0.2268 -1.2727
(0.1267)* (0.7676)
Individual Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
LWH Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346545 346545 232701 24948 24948 24948 17664 24948
Enforcement Elasticity 0.33 0.58 0.18
∆ IMI if ∆-SD in LWH (#) 16.83% 21.68% 22.78% 8.22% 6.83%
Non-Immigrant Visas 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
Labor Contract Visas 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
Visas 
Border Enforcement 
(millions of line-watch hours)
General SpecificationVisas 
Intensive Migration BehaviorExtensive Migration Behavior
Mexican Inflation 
(annual change in CPI )
Enforcement squared
(millions of line-watch hours)
Predicted Mexican Wages 
(const. 2000 Pesos, thousands)
Predicted U.S. Wages 
(const. 2000 Dollars, thousands)
Migration Networks
(# of parents ever in US)
Green Cards 
(millions granted to Mexicans)
 
Notes: ***", "**", "*" significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at year level. Regional 
enforcement is millions of total enforcement hours per year and Mexican state (see Appendix A). Columns 3 and 7 include maximum of 15 years of recall. Column 8 
uses no MMP sampling weights. (#) Normalized change in IMI: change in IMI due to standard deviation increase in border enforcement divided by IMI’s standard 
deviation (columns 5 to 8 refer to respective IMI indicator). All IV regressions use political majority instruments. 
